Showing posts with label domain of thought. Show all posts
Showing posts with label domain of thought. Show all posts

Saturday, 16 July 2016

Se7en (David Fincher, USA, 1995)

‘We’ve got one dead guy,’ carps the Captain of Police, ‘not three.’

1 – Gluttony. A murder victim is discovered, and homicide detectives William Somerset and David Mills are asked to check out the scene. Bound and force fed with a gun to his head, a morbidly obese man has been tortured to his death. Somerset sees something here: ‘This is just the beginning.’ He wants off the case, he can’t see it through – his last week in his role on the murder team before retirement. Mills wants it, first day in job, just arrived from a small town up-state with his wife Tracy. Mills is dropped; they need Somerset’s experience.

2 – Greed. The next day, Mills – awaiting some action – is called to some hotshot lawyer’s office. There’s another dead guy here, one who has been persuaded to cut a pound of flesh from his own body. On the floor, in blood, the words ‘greed’. Back at the station, Somerset believes the crimes are connected: possibly something to do with the Seven Deadly Sins. Either way, Mills and Somerset are back on the same case. Stomach contents from the fat man lead Somerset to find the words ‘gluttony’ scraped in grease behind the fridge at the first crime scene; an upside down picture at the second scene gives them some fingerprints. ‘So many clues,’ says Somerset, ‘just lead to others’. And so it is…

3 – Sloth. The fingerprints are a clue which lead to Victor, tied to a bed for a year, drip-fed the drugs he used to deal.

Se7en is inspired by the power of a habitual series of elements. Such a cinematic series is what Deleuze calls a relation-image, where the elements are designated through the sign of the mark...

To read the full exploration of Se7en through the Deleuze's sign of the 'mark,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Sunday, 5 June 2016

Doctor Who – The Day of the Doctor (Nick Hurran, UK, 2013)

‘Three of them!’ exclaims the general at Gallifrey High Command, ‘…all my worst nightmares at once.’ He has returned – three incarnations, simultaneously.

The planet of the Time Lords is under attack by the Daleks. War between two of the most powerful species in the universe. On the one hand, the Time Lords – humanoids who long ago overcame the limits of space, time and mortality; passive observers from Gallifrey of the joys and woes of planets, systems, and galaxies, the rise and fall of civilisations past, present and future. On the other hand, the Daleks – organic mutants devoid of all emotion housed inside metal travelling machines; creatures intent on enslaving or killing everyone and everything. This is the Time War – and it has been raging for eons. In the process, every lifeform in the universe has suffered, caught between an immovable object and an unstoppable force. But now the conflict appears to be in its final phase – and the Daleks are winning. Gallifrey is under siege, the Time Lords are surrounded by the entire Dalek army orbiting the planet, bombarding it from above. And if the Time Lords are beaten, the universe will have new masters.

Such is the scenario of Doctor Who – The Day of the Doctor: the 240th tv story (approximately, valid number systems vary) in a series running (on and off – at time of screening) for 50 years. The series concerns – at the centre – the Doctor, an errant Time Lord who ‘borrowed’ a TARDIS (time and space machine) and went off to explore the far corners of the universe. During an early trip to Earth, the chameleon circuit on the TARDIS malfunctioned, so its image is now fixed as an old 1950s British police box, instead of changing to fit the landscape in which it arrives. However, the Doctor has become, over the years, rather attached to its form. Selecting companions from the worlds he chances upon, pitching up where he will to have adventures, the Doctor has been aroaming for well over a thousand years, fighting evil wherever he may find it. Many, many years ago now, when an old man for the first time – grouchy, frail and beginning to lose his faculties – he regenerated (much to the surprise of his friends) into another body. Since then, his companions – and there have been many – have witnessed numerous such regenerations and incarnations... And after each regeneration the Doctor has continued his quest – to travel from world to world, intervening on the side of justice, to set right the wrongs he encounters, to heal the hurts and bind the wounds of the universe. This is the Doctor – all of them.

However, now – in The Day of the Doctor – the Eleventh Doctor must confront a secret he has hidden for a long time. We have known since the Ninth Doctor appeared on the scene that he was the last of the Time Lords, that his race was annihilated in the final battle of the Time War, that he was caught up in events, and that these events haunt him. In The Day of the Doctor the story is revealed. It was he who killed his own people – every last man, woman and child. Or rather it was an incarnation of this renegade Time Lord we have never seen...

Except – the incarnation of the Time Lord who committed these atrocities was not the Doctor. In order to explore such a paradox, we can turn to Deleuze’s cineosis – or cinematic semiosis – and the avatar of the relation-image. A relation-image is constituted through a succession of images that create a habitual series... However, ‘it is always possible,’ writes Deleuze, ‘for one of these terms to leap outside the web and suddenly appear in conditions which take it out of its series, or set it in contradiction with it’ (C1:203). This is the demark...

To read the full exploration of Doctor Who – The Day of the Doctor through the Deleuze's sign of the 'demark,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Wednesday, 18 May 2016

The Machinist (Brad Anderson, Spain | USA, 2004)

Actor Christian Bale captures Trevor’s deterioration through his emaciated frame, blank stares, mumbling drawl and slow movements; and director Brad Anderson shoots the film in half-light, all murky blue-greys. It is as if The Machinist is a dream, or dream-like. Accordingly – and as the film progresses – it becomes uncertain if Trevor does sometimes sleep and dream, or if dreams are invading his waking world as hallucinations. (Or even some complex amalgam of the two, some back and forth between these states). Dreams, nightmares, hallucinations – this is Trevor’s real world. Where does the nightmare end and the world begin? Deleuze describes such dream-images as an ‘unhinging,’ the restrained dream. Restrained in the sense that the transformation of the real world into the dream or the dream world into the real is not signalled by rich cinematographics. No closing of eyes and crossfade into the weird and crazy images of the unconscious. No return from dreams through a character opening their eyes and retaining awareness of the dream: images as well as the condition. Rather, in the restrained dream the image ‘“looks like” dream, but between objects that remain concrete’ (C2:58). Dream world and real world become ambiguous; and the effect of each domain on the other is very powerful: the character believes or thinks the dream was a moment of the real.

To read the full exploration of The Machinist through the Deleuze's sign of the 'restrained dream,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Thursday, 21 April 2016

Triangle (Christopher Smith, UK | Australia, 2009)

Jess faces Jess with a shotgun. ‘You’re not me,’ she whispers, finger on the trigger, priming herself to
fire. ‘You’re not me,’ she says again, tears in her eyes. This confrontation takes place in the once-plush ballroom of the Aeolus, a ghost-ship, an ocean liner long lost in the mysterious seas of the Caribbean. Director Christopher Smith’s camera will swoop around and between, encircle and encompass the doppelgängers: hyper-fast tracking shots, bullet-time; close-ups and over-the-shoulder shots flip-flopping and reorienting the point-of-view from one Jess to the other, back and forth. Jess with the shotgun cannot – however – seem to pull the trigger. The other Jess backs away, breathing slowly, she turns, and flees. Jess lowers the gun. Turns to Victor, who is slumped against a wall, dying, covered in his own blood: ‘this didn’t happen before, don’t you see?’ Jess now thinks she understands what is happening. Events and the people who traverse them are caught in a circuit, a helter-skelter with infinite rides – but the instants that fill out each circuit are not fixed. Jess can change what happens, make up for what she has done, escape the loop. The present can efface the past for the future. She just has to kill everyone first...

No doubt a lot of fun can be had trying to figure out how Triangle works, the logic of cause and effect that powers the narration. Such solutions would necessarily point toward spatio-temporal dissonances: time-travel, which would be subject to grandfather paradoxes, in turn referring to the cutting edge of physics and the quantum inspired speculative situations of many worlds; worlds which would fold back upon themselves overlaying and becoming exposed to one another. However, there is another approach – at once far simpler, and infinitely more complex. We can begin by referring to Deleuze’s cineosis, and to a type of recollection-image named the forking path. Recollection-images describe memories: perceptions, affects and actions coalescing on-screen as moments of the past actualized in the present for the future. In their most familiar aspect, recollection-images will be constituted through flashbacks, memories actualised to provide – in varying degrees – ‘an explanation, a causality or a linearity’ (C2:49). However, the recollection-image can also give us memory as the ‘fragmentation of all linearity… [as] breaks in causality’  (C2:49)...

To read the full exploration of Triangle through the Deleuze's sign of the 'forking path,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Friday, 25 March 2016

Star Trek – First Contact (Jonathan Frakes, USA, 1996)

Without doubt – one of the most beautiful camera moves in cinema history. Neither a dolly-out nor
zoom-out as such, but effectively both in (and possible only through) CGI – the camera pulls back from a black screen to reveal an eye. The eye becomes a face – Jean-Luc Picard, now captain of the Enterprise-E – and the face stares straight into the lens. As the camera continues on its reverse trajectory, the mise-en-scène reveals Picard is captured in a glass tube that is part of a spaceship, either side of him other beings, and behind each of them, many more. This section of the ship is but a fragment of an immense superstructure, the core or hub in an area so impossibly vast the camera never seems to encompass it. It is like a fractal – never-ending. Cut to corridor, the camera flies through the space, side to side, a disembodied spirit. Picard restrained on an operating table, his head encased in machinery. Picard in his tube – eyes close – he gasps. Picard with his face now augmented with Borg technology – merely an outward sign of his assimilation into the hive mind: ‘Locutus’ – comes a woman’s voice at the edge of consciousness. The image on screen distorts. ‘I am Locutus of Borg,’ whispers what was once-Picard, and turning to face the camera: ‘Resistance is futile’. A drill enters Picard’s eye.

Picard awakes from this dream-image. Director Jonathan Frakes, by zooming in on a sleeping Picard as he opens his eyes, signals this first moment of Star Trek – First Contact as a dream. As a nightmare. These are not memories, as such. Rather – they are perceptions, affections and actions subsumed within an unconscious state. For Deleuze, dream-images conjure up a ‘metamorphosis of the situation’ by linking dream situation to waking situation and so negotiating the latter through the former (C2:273). Accordingly, the dream-image of Star Trek – First Contact describes the sign of the rich dream...

To read the full exploration of Star Trek – First Contact through the Deleuze's sign of the 'rich dream,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Saturday, 19 March 2016

The Wandering Cloud (Tsai Ming-liang, France | Taiwan, 2005)

It was only a matter of time – of course – before a film such as The Wandering Cloud. The pornographic musical. Or, musical-porno. Take your pick. Yet such descriptions – which no doubt director Tsai Ming-liang would appreciate, as provocation – belie the subversive nature of the movie, and the power of Tsai’s images of sex and music. The setting is Kaohsiung, an affluent port city in southern Taiwan. The long hot summer rolls on, people move slowly through the wide, beautiful parks and along the boulevards shadowed beneath sky-scrappers. Kaohsiung is in the midst of a drought – the reservoirs are depleted, the rivers running dry and household water services intermittent. Here we find Hsiao-Kang and Shiang-chyi, a man and a woman aimlessly drifting through life. Hsiao-Kang sleeps wherever he finds himself when needing a nap: children’s playgrounds, stairwell suicide nets, roofs of tall buildings. Shiang-chyi wanders the streets collecting empty water bottles to stockpile tap water, amusing herself with diverting conundrums, or lazing in her apartment watching television. Inevitably, they meet – vaguely recognising one another (Hsiao-Kang sold Shiang-chyi a timepiece in a previous film by Tsai, who tends to reuse characters without any real deference to continuity). They begin an affair – although their interactions, even when close, are disconnected. When they eat, one will sit on a chair at the table, the other underneath. When they share a room, both will be occupied in separate tasks. This distance between the lovers is further evoked by a radical lack of dialogue. The Wandering Cloud – in these sections – is essentially silent, only a word or phrase occasionally spoken. Shiang-chyi has misplaced the key to a locked suitcase. She finds it set into the tarmac of the road beneath her high-rise. Yet when Hsiao-Kang retrieves the key, still the case cannot be opened. Is it the right key? Or is the lock no longer functioning? Tsai is a master of the cinematic metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche: images echo one another, scenes evoke associations, inconsequential actions point to the real, implied situation, which remains an ellipsis.

Shiang-chyi is addicted to watermelons... Hsiao-Kang is working as a porno actor... The musical-episodes do not emerge through a natural flow from an event in the day-to-day film-world, but appear as a break, a rupture. They cleft the screen, for a moment. Nevertheless – they extend from and through the everyday-moments and pornographic-sequences, combining the figure-elements of the characters: watermelons and sex. In this way, these musical-episodes echo moments and sequences from the rest of the film, evoke associations and refer to the real, implied situation, which remains an ellipsis. They are the expressions of joy and disappointment neither Hsiao-Kang nor Shiang-chyi are able to actualise. The Wandering Cloud creates images of thought – what Deleuze calls plastic figures: where ‘the action does not immediately disclose the situation which it envelops, but is itself developed in grandiose situations which encompass the implied situation’ (C1:182)…

To read the full exploration of The Wandering Cloud through the Deleuze's sign of the 'plastic figure,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Tuesday, 8 March 2016

Fish Tank (Andrea Arnold, UK | Netherlands, 2009)

Mia dances for herself. There is an empty, abandoned flat in the estate where she lives. With faded, ripped wallpaper, tatty carpet, but a space apart from the world – away from the lads and lasses hanging around the tower blocks, and her mum and sister at home. Sometimes tanked up on cheap booze (bought by teenagers old enough to pass for eighteen), Mia dances for herself. To get good; to get better. To exhaust herself. To empty herself – of the rage, of the sadness, of the loneliness. But rage, sadness and loneliness are in endless supply. There are thus two escapes in Mia’s dancing – an escape from the world, and an escape from herself. These escapes are inseparable, but one feeds the other. For the world determines her being, her actions, her behaviour. Director Andrea Arnold’s mise-en-scène in Fish Tank thus has a precise function. This is no urban wasteland. This is no zone on the edge, on the periphery, this is a fairly well-maintained estate, with shops and social spaces to hang out. A vibrant community. This is a common space, a naturalised space, a space where many of us live. Yet Mia is at war with everyone. With her mother – who feels her youth slipping away, and sees her daughter only in terms of her sexuality; ordered out of the flat when there is a party, there will be men there. With the boys of the estate – who will harass and attempt to rape her as punishment for her interference in their activities. With the girls – who appear only to desire acceptance from the lads as some kind of validation. Such is the situation of the film-world of Fish Tank. Such are the powerful forces permeating Mia as she discovers her sexuality. This is her rage, her sadness, her loneliness. Although she has not got her head around it all – not yet. Arnold’s project is to allow Mia to traverse this world of the film, to perceive and be affected by that world; to become saturated by the milieu. How much can Mia endure before something happens? Before Mia decisively reacts?

Fish Tank is a film of the imprint: the impression of the milieu upon the body at the centre. For Deleuze, the imprint is an action-image; where perception, affect and thought are orientated toward and so dominated by action. Here, the characters perceive, feel and think so they can act. Action-images explicate situations (milieus, environments) and explore actions (behaviours, being in the world). In the first place, the small form action-image (ASA) extends through perception-images and affection-images towards an action that reveals the situation; in the second place, the large form action-image (SAS) begins with a given situation and determines the actions of the characters through their perceptions and affects. With the large form action-image, accordingly, the logic of the sensory-motor system as a linear trajectory (perception → affect → action) reaches its fullest expression. This is the fundamental essence of cinematic realism and where the movement-image is ultimately fulfilled. Milieux are givens, and the characters are caught in the forces of that world, which organise into conflicts – binomials: duels. And it is through the actions, the behaviours of the characters, that the situation will be resolved. ‘[T]he cinema of behaviour,’ however ‘is not content with a simple sensory-motor formula’ (C1:158). With the imprint, according to Deleuze, there is a ‘much more complex behaviourism,’ one which explores ‘internal factors’ (C1:158). It is as if the affection-image does not immediately pass through the body for an action-image, but affects accumulate, build-up, until they become intolerable. In this way the duel is no longer externalised in the world, or rather, that is not its primary domain. The conflict is within the body at the centre of the film.

To read the full exploration of Fish Tank through the Deleuze's sign of the 'imprint,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Saturday, 27 February 2016

Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 1 and Part 2 (David Yates, UK | USA, 2010 | 2011)

In one of the most beautiful and disturbing moments of recent cinema, Harry Potter – defeated by the evil wizard Voldemort with a killing curse – awakens to discover himself dead. Apparently… Yet all
is not as it at first seems. Harry walks in his own limbo-construct. Curiously, he encounters a dying version of the evil Dark Lord, curled up foetus-like. This bloody abortion is a horcrux, torn from its host – Harry. As Harry explores the immense brilliant-white dream environment (‘like King’s Cross Station, only cleaner’), he stumbles upon a manifestation of his old mentor Dumbledore, and – finally – learns the truth. Harry is not dead. Rather, Voldemort has unknowingly destroyed a part of himself that was hidden within Harry, and Harry is now free of his horcrux function. His body in the real world is merely unconscious.

Horcruxes are magical objects that host a quantum embodiment of one’s soul, effectively making the owner immortal. If you have transformed an object into a horcrux and your body is destroyed, you can be resurrected through the power of a horcrux. Yet the deal is monstrous. These objects can only be created in the wake of a killing. Voldemort, known as Tom Marvolo Riddle when young, discovered this forbidden dark spell and, over the years that followed, set about creating a number of horcruxes for himself as he arose to become the Dark Lord. However, just before he attained total power over the world, he was involved in an event that brought Harry into the story and which also stymied his diabolical plan. For Voldemort – attempting to annihilate all resistance – killed the Potters, but in so-doing was himself destroyed. Yet, at that moment of his death, a part of his soul attached itself to their son, Harry. Since this event, Harry has been a horcrux of his reptilianesque foe – unbeknownst to himself and indeed the subsequently resurrected Voldemort. It is such a resurrection that concerns the films of the cycle preceding the Deathly Hallows diptych; and it is the final diptych that will see Voldemort once again attempt to take over the world. Concomitantly, Harry and his friends discover the source of Voldemort’s immortality: the horcruxes. Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 1 begins the quest to identify, locate and destroy these magical objects – a particularly difficult and dangerous task, and one that remains unfulfilled, awaiting Part 2. In this second film of the Deathly Hallows, furthermore, it is revealed Harry must also sacrifice his own life to the cause – there has always been a link between himself and Voldemort, forged in the moment of the Dark Lord’s first death, and Harry is led to believe severing this link is essential. Hence the duel in the woods with the evil wizard, and Harry’s apparent martyrdom. Yet in the limbo-construct, Harry understands the subterfuge, a necessary secret kept from him by Dumbledore so Voldemort would not discover the deception. For the Dark Lord – the creator of this horcrux – was the only one who could destroy its function without annihilating Harry.

The scene is now set for the young wizard’s consciousness to return to his body, his friends and the fray – in order to complete his mission. For only once all the remaining horcruxes are obliterated will Voldemort be mortal, and only then can he finally be killed. These horcruxes are thus very powerful magical objects, and can be seen to be essential to the story of the Deathly Hallows. Indeed, the whole Harry Potter cycle is dependent upon these and other magical objects: wands, crystal balls, amulets, broomsticks, animals, even sports equipment. Deleuze calls such objects ‘fetishes’. Fetishes are impulse-images, the condensation of primal forces and intensities from the world in special objects. It is these objects which sustain, retain and preserve energies, and which, under certain conditions, will discharge these energies back into the world...

To read the full exploration of Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows: Part 1 and Part 2 through the Deleuze's sign of the 'fetish,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Sunday, 21 February 2016

Innocence (Lucile Hadzihalilovic, Belgium | France | UK | Japan, 2004)

The park – during the long summer days – is a vast woodland playground. After lessons are out, or at
weekends, they can enjoy themselves here. Pretty little waterfalls cascade over rocks covered in lichen, feeding the river which meanders through the trees, the wide banks creating shallow areas where the girls can swim. The high stone wall that surrounds the park, covered with climbing plants, keeps them safe from the outside world. Nearer to the school, the forest thins out into well-maintained glades interspaced with open areas to play hoopla, or ride on swings. Little pathways connect all these spaces, running from the five houses which the girls now call home, and to the main school building.

At night, however, the paths are forbidding trajectories. Lit from above with electric lamps strung between the trees, they barely cut through the dark and the now impenetrable woods where night time noises echo. Ominous, sinister pathways that wind this way and that, and terminate in unknown events. Bianca will leave the younger girls at the house, and walk these paths alone. Director Lucile Hadzihalilovic places her camera at the mouth of this dark entry, and a static frame captures Bianca as she moves through each pool of light, until the darkness finally engulfs her. Bianca will join the other oldest girls from each of the houses; but we will not follow, not yet. It is – for us, for now – forbidden knowledge. Such is the cinematographic image of Innocence, a world in which primal forces permeate the mise-en-scène.

Hadzihalilovic creates an originary world. An originary world is an impulse-image, an image of the powerful intensive and primal forces that permeate the milieu from its beginning to its end. The milieu is a defined space, a determined environment with geographical and historical co-ordinates. Yet this space floats upon a world of primal, nameless and undefined forces. Deleuze writes, this impulse-image is ‘the world which is revealed as the basis of the social milieux which are so powerfully described… an originary world, which rumbles in the depths of all the milieux and runs along beneath them’ (C1:125)...

To read the full exploration of Innocence through the Deleuze's sign of the 'originary world,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...



Friday, 12 February 2016

Despicable Me, Despicable Me 2 (Pierre Coffin and Chris Renaud, USA, 2010 | 2013) and Minions (Kyle Balda and Pierre Coffin, USA, 2015)

The minions are – on the one hand – a mass. Their forms composed of a restricted number of elements, they have limited differentials. Elongated or rotund bodies; short, medium or tall in height; bald, bristly or centre parted hair, one or two eyes. From these elements a number of composite types
are generated, perhaps as many as forty or fifty possible combinations. This limited palette results in hundreds of similar individuations composing the thousands of actual existing minions. Yet – on the other hand – it appears each will have some semblance of a sense of self, of an I. We even know some of their names: Kevin (tall, thin, two eyes); Bob (short and rotund, with one eye); Dave (short, rotund, with two eyes and a centre parting); Larry (medium in height, two eyes). Thus while evidence suggests that they are genderless, their names are those usually associated with certain groups of human males, though this may well be simple affectation and a sign of cultural assimilation. Where and how they originate is still mysterious, it has been said they are clones, although recent research indicates they have been around since well before the Holocene.

Minions are thus neither a homogenous mass nor heterogeneous individuals: they are both. They are dividual: a pack, a group, a multitude. The deindividualisation of entities and the individualisation of the mass – this is the dividual. Here are ‘produced,’ writes Deleuze ‘compact and continuous intensive series, which go beyond all binary structures and exceed the duality of the collective and the individual (C1:92)...

To read the full exploration of Despicable Me, Despicable Me 2 and Minions through the Deleuze's sign of the 'dividual,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images

Saturday, 6 February 2016

The Terrorist (Santosh Sivan, India, 1998)

Malli is nineteen. Her eyes captivate: large, luminous white with hazel then ebony centres. Her lips are generous, but secretive. Hair lustrous: long, black, straight. Her dark skin glows with vitality. A
face of gentle features, yet with a strength that belies her years. This is how the screen sees Malli – in close-up, and extreme close-up. A dance between the camera and the face of actor Ayesha Dharker. Malli is caught up in events in the world, or a hidden observer looking on, lost in her thoughts, her recollections, and the camera remains on her face, focuses upon her eyes, her mouth, her expression – the shot or sequence lasting a wonderful little eternity. Such shots and sequences will approach silence, except for her breathing and the ever-present sounds of nature; or sometimes such images are overwhelmed by a score of synthetic strings. Everything is in close-up. The whole film is organised around this aesthetic: the dominion and the potential of the close-up. Director Santosh Sivan focuses upon a life, moments in a life, life through the expressions of a woman’s face, expressions of the affects, intensities and forces within. Sivan and Dharker create a film of the icon.

For Deleuze, the icon is an affection-image, a sign of the unfilmable internal intensities of the body expressed through a face in close-up.

To read the full exploration of The Terrorist through the Deleuze's sign of the 'icon,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images

Wednesday, 2 October 2013

Metro Manila (Sean Ellis, UK | Philippines, 2013)

The transformation in form and twist in the tale of Metro Manila – no matter how effective – may tempt us to believe we have encountered betrayal and excess. Oscar, Mai and their children escape the toil of the rice terraces in Benguet province for the big city – and things go from bad to worse. Their exodus is a consequence of a rural mafia controlling, at the sharp-end, the economics of the farmers’ market. Obliged to sell the grown, harvested and husked rice at a reduced rate (now two centavos a pound down from ten the year before) it becomes clear the Ramirez family will not be able to afford seed for the next season. In Manila, the family witness their remaining savings plundered by con-artists, lose their accommodation, and must walk dangerous streets, tipping up in the slum. Oscar is ripped off and abandoned after a day’s work shifting rubble; Mai lands a job as a dancer and hostess at Charlie’s, the children hanging out backstage while mummy grinds down on Euro-detritus with Yankee dollars for G-strings (…‘smile’). Such narration, filmed hand-held in close-up down on the streets, has a social-realist feel. The milieu, revealed through the trials of the family, is proven time and time again as corrupt, as exploitative, as fundamentally uncaring. Yet, as Steve Rose identifies, ‘the tide starts to turn when husband Oscar lands a job with a security-van company, a development that slowly, stealthily leads the story out of social drama territory and into a crime-thriller realm’ (Rose, The Guardian, 19/09/13). We move, in this way, from eternal misery and social-realism to classical-realism and overcoming, toward a narration with gangsters, guns, and a heist, where Oscar’s heroic sacrifice allows Mai and their children to flee Manila with a tasty amount of pesos. And it is such a transformation in form that tempts us to see a betrayal, a turning away from the social-realist political stance which first engendered the story.

Samantha Lay has outlined some of the essential features of social-realism, which always depend upon – it seems – an oppositional relationship with classical-realist structures. For example, while in mainstream cinema ‘the monster is killed, the criminal is caught or gets his or her comeuppance, mistaken identities are unravelled, the romantic couple are united, and so on,’ social realism has ‘something to say about “things as they really are”’ (Lay, 2002:20). Mainstream cinema ‘merely entertain[s]’ creating ‘more or less stable resolutions.’ Social-realism, cannot discover such triumphs in the real world, it ‘resists resolutions and the future is rarely bright’ (Lay, 2002:21). For Sophie Monks Kaufman the transformation in forms in Metro Manila is thus a betrayal, Ellis ‘doesn’t give Mai's plight the screen time to emerge as she (and the social realism her presence represents) is sidelined by the emerging thriller driven by Oscar's job as an armoured truck driver’ (Monks Kaufman, Little White Lies, 2013). Yet perhaps there is another way to look at Metro Manila. The movie begins in social-realist mode, with the family leaving the country for the city, and this mode extends well into the urban environment. Eventually, however, there is a divergence. Oscar’s narration increasing moves into heist movie territory, as Mai and her children continue the social-realist line. Oscar’s sacrifice terminates his trajectory along the classical-realist line. But through his sacrifice, Mai can abandon social-realist suffering, and move toward a classical-realist resolution. Now rich, no longer having to return to Charlie’s, she and the children can escape the city. Metro Manila, in other words, does not simply transform from social-realism into classical-realism, but rather – in the middle section of the film – sets up a discourse between the two forms. It is such a dialogue that we can explore through the Deleuzian cinematic concept of ... the limit of all action-images.

To read the full exploration of Metro Manila through the Deleuze's sign of the 'limit of the action-image ,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...


Tuesday, 19 July 2011

Le quattro volte (Michelangelo Frammartino, Italy | Germany | Switzerland, 2010)

Roman centurions in the back of a rusty old truck. This image throws out-of-joint the day-to-day linear time that has so far been experienced following the life, and eventual death, of Fuda, an aged goatherd in the southern Italian countryside of Calabria. While the ancients are revealed as participants in a modern-day passion play, this does little to re-anchor a linear temporal flow. Rather, it exposes the durations that subsist in the spatial field, and announces an ongoing series of such spatio-temporal disturbances. Director Michelangelo Frammartino uses the real time of the long take to make us feel the affect of time, reveal the clamour of times in the spaces we inhabit. The shot is simple, at least in terms of camera movement, panning this way then that through 180 degrees. A dog patters up and down a country lane, the truck and centurions arrive, people in costumes and every-day work-wear gather, the procession begins, from the village and out into the fields. The past subsists in this space and this present is the coexistence of all kinds of pasts, many different spatial strata. History, myth and cyclical time arise, real and imaginary events, yearly repetitions. Four Times: linear time, cyclical time, mythical time and time out-of-joint. The affects of these disparate but interfolding times are explored by Frammartino through the rigorous unfolding of the film: four sections on the duration of the existence of human, animal, vegetative and non-organic states. These four spatio-temporal series can be seen as four aspects of the any-space-whatever, Deleuze’s cinematic sign of indeterminate affects.

The any-space-whatever concerns affection-images. Affection-images, in the first instance, can be said to be close-ups of an expression on a character’s face, outward signs of internal intensities, after perception, before impulses or actions, and at the gateway of thought. Yet it is not only the face as sign that can express affect. The second sign of composition is the dividual, complex qualities and powers of the mass, group, assemblage. Then there is the any-space-whatever, genetic sign of the affection-image – from which the affects of the mass and the individual arise. A pure background, indeterminate space-times where the affect is encountered without the necessity of mediation of a character of characters. A setting as an intensity of forces, empty or disconnected spaces developing the indeterminacies of gaseous perception and resisting the determinate space-time of action. Ahuman affects, forces prior to the human or after the withdrawing of human centres. Any-space-whatevers – however – belong to the movement-image and thus tend to be captured up in compositions of the dividual and the icon, the ascension of the assemblage and an emergent central and privileged image. Ahuman affects are composed into human affects. Yet such mappings have a certain fragility: in other conditions (set free from the movement-image) an any-space-whatever can become an opsign-sonsign, a pure optical and sound situation, a time-image, an actual on-screen undifferenciated visual and audio image. Without human centres to express affects there is a univocal coalescence of genetic forces: the coalescence of indeterminacy. We experience time in its raw state, no longer an image of thought, but an image that is disruptive of thought. Accordingly, the four states of the any-space-whatever: (1) captured up through the icon; (2) sustaining the assemblage of the dividual; (3) in itself as reference to the affection-image and movement-image; (4) in itself as a condition for the time-image.

It is tempting to align these four states of the any-space-whatever with Frammartino’s Four Times...

To read the full exploration of Four Times through the Deleuze's sign of the 'any-space-whatever,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...


Tuesday, 14 June 2011

A Screaming Man (Mahamat-Saleh Haroun, France | Belgium | Chad, 2010)

Sunlight disperses upon the surface of the brilliant white net curtains that cover the large window,
shielding the room from the worst of the heat. Adam Ousmane sits across the wooden desk from Mme Wang, who is attended by her secretary. Silence, except for the faint sound of a pen scratching on paper. The office belongs to the new manager of the hotel in which Adam is employed as head pool attendant. ‘How old are you Adam?’ … ‘I often see you sitting in your chair?’ … ‘Do you really think we need two employees?’ Mme Wang makes further notes as Adam responds. Director Mahamat-Saleh Haroun’s camera lingers within these silences. Camera movement is discreet, reduced to a bare minimum, medium shots predominate and editing only occurs when absolutely necessary for a reframing. Colour is natural, the mise-en-scène sparse and diegetic sound prevails. The actors are restrained, sotto voce, gesture minimalised. Such procedures accentuate the everydayness of the film, but also inspire a subtle beauty in the image. At night, a long take of Adam on his motorbike, its lights illuminating the white walls of an alleyway, is breath-taking. Adam stands at a window of his house, sunshine plays upon his naked torso, the curtains are slowly allowed to fall back into place and enshadow him as he distances himself from what is happening outside. This cinematic asceticism has an immediate correlate with another procedure, one which transforms the simple into something far more complex. Missing moments: critical instants are effaced from the narration and do not appear on-screen. Such ellipses are an essential function of the story, of the narrative. Not in the sense that they are hidden so as to create mystery, and thus be recuperated, ultimately revealed, reclaimed in order to explain. Rather, these omissions are withheld to echo what another character could not know. These missing moments may be obvious (a cut in the middle of an important scene) or obscure (we may only realise later that something has been withheld). More significantly – such moments mirror what the character wishes to hide: their deceptions, disloyalties, dishonesty. Their shame, what they would not want others to know, the full import of their actions, words, silences. Character motivations are ambiguous, for others, for themselves and for the spectator. And Haroun ensures such ellipses are never revealed, ever sustained.

In this way – through the directness of the image and the complexity of ellipses – A Screaming Man creates a powerful image of everydayness, of the quotidian...

To read the full exploration of A Screaming Man through the Deleuze's sign of the 'quotidian,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Thursday, 21 April 2011

Source Code (Duncan Jones, Canada | France | USA, 2011)

Time is frozen. Locked in an eternal kiss, Fentress and Christina will forever be in this moment, for all eternity. The camera tracks back through the train carriage, a liquid, flowing trajectory, weaving through the other passengers who are caught in unending silent laughter. A comedian (cajoled by Fentress into an impromptu, celebratory gig) stands in the centre of the aisle – a punchline delivered in perpetuity. On the second tier of the carriage, a woman in amongst the audience has allowed her coffee to spill, and the liquid has become a solid, remains mid-air in suspended animation. Shafts of sunlight catching dust are rendered for infinity.

The perfect ending.

However, such an ending has a correlate genesis. The environment of the train carriage – and indeed the world and universe through which the train cuts its path – are an ambiguous and perplexing construct. In the real world, Colleen Goodwin – a member of a shadowy scientific programme operating at the fringes of the military complex – has switched off the life-support system that sustained the meat and mind of soldier Colter Stevens. Stevens was a half-life: what remained of his body merely a bagged and tagged trunk, mutilated arm and shattered skull; comatose and unconscious, his mind endured only through the software developed by maverick scientist Dr. Rutledge. Stevens can rest in peace, finally. The death of Stevens, accordingly, is the source of the freeze-frame and the true ending of Source Code; the condition for the perfect denouement on the train. For Fentress was Stevens. Or rather, the mind of Stevens was projected back across and through spacetime into the body of Fentress, who – along with Christina and the other passengers – died some hours before in a horrific terrorist bombing. Stevens has – through a series of repetitions lasting some eight minutes, the eight minutes prior to the bombing – inhabited Fentress time and time again in order to investigate the incident and identify the bomber. For if the terrorist can be identified in the past, they can be detained in the present and prevented from committing further atrocities.

Impossibly, however – beyond all reason – everything starts up again. On the train the event is reanimated, stasis returns to flux. Somehow this moment in the past continues beyond the death of Stevens in the present (just as it passed beyond the moment of the bombing, which has been averted by the actions of Fentress) and this (re)invented universe is preserved. The perfect climax and the true denouement are both a ruse. And continuing past these fake endings derails the filmic line, diverts the cinematic trajectory into a series of ambiguities from which Source Code will not – and will not wish to – escape. Time travel dovetails with many worlds. Is this universe in which Stevens now lives as Fentress the same world? Another world? A parallel reality? A simulation? Was quantum parabolic calculus time travel an access to the past of the present, an alternate real or some kind of computer encoded space as remnant or echo event? These ambiguities become active only by going beyond the moment of dual-closure. Crucially, and in this way, Source Code goes on to foreground an ethical impasse. Furthermore, in so doing, the narrative is extended into the contemporary political environment. To explore such productive elements, we can do no better than turn to the cinematic semiotics of Deleuze.

Source Code is an action movie, and Deleuze describes such films as action-images. In the first place, action-images are of two types. There is the large form, where a given situation engenders behaviour, actions which attempt to rectify the situation (played out through duels between characters). This aspect of the action-image can be seen in Source Code: the train has been destroyed in a terrorist attack, and Colter will be embodied in Fentress to enter into a duel with the bomber. The film tracks a character in their becoming equal to the milieu, and in so doing, going on to rectify the situation. However, the film also has elements of the other type of action-image. This is the small form, where character actions explore an elliptical situation. Colter must continually re-enter the milieu to attempt to reveal its coordinates. Who is the bomber? What do they want? What will they do next? In parallel, the large form and small forms in the construct inspire further interactions between on-going repetitions of the immediate past and the real world of the present. Colter must discover what is happening to him: who he is, where he is. And this can only be done through a duel with Rutledge, the military scientist who has sustained his life and is using Colter as a weapon. In other words, small form action-images and large form action images interweave, and describe a very special type of action-image: the reflection-image where large and small transform one another as figures of attraction. Thus, in the second place, Deleuze describes two compositional forms of such attraction-images: the plastic figure and the theatrical figure. When a film of the action-image small form (action → situation) is affected by the large form we encounter the plastic figure. When a film of the action-image large form (situation → action) is affected by the small form, we encounter the theatrical figure. Either way, writes Deleuze ‘there is no longer a direct relation between a situation and an action, an action and a situation: between the two images, or between the two elements of the image, a third intervenes to ensure the conversion of the forms’ (C1:182). This third is a mental-image: the figure. With plastic figures the situation revealed on-screen is an encompasser of the true situation; the real situation remains an ellipsis. With the theatrical figure the real situation is expressed in ongoing fictional actions. Source Code appears to capture a moment of indeterminacy between these two mental-images... The movie – in other words – enacts a recurrence of attraction-images: mise-en-abyme.

To read the full exploration of Source Code through the cineotic sign of the 'mise-en-abyme,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...



Monday, 14 March 2011

True Grit (Ethan Coen & Joel Coen, USA, 2010)

One moment emblematic of True Grit: Lucky Ned Pepper’s teeth. Dental calculus fused to crooked pegs, a fresh coating of furry biofilm the colour of English mustard set in a grimace of dried, cracked lips. Some real dirty realism. Take the voices: the almost subsonic, sometimes incompressible growl of Rooster Coburn; the transformation of LaBoeuf’s measured, dignified articulations to comic thwollen tongued thounds; the educated, erudite precision and farm-hand tenacity of young Mattie – all circumscribed by the style of the King James Bible. Wonderful. And the same goes for the situations traversed by the characters: Mattie and the pony salesman, Rooster getting drunk on his horse, LaBoeuf and his hissy-fits – all encompassed in a wintering wild west, the indifference of humanity and nature both sides of the river frontier: Fort Smith and the lands of the Choctaw. Realism, yet more-so. True Grit is a joy.

Yet the question has been asked, do we need True Grit? In the first place, it is an old style classic western. In the second place, it is a remake of old style classic western. ‘This True Grit,’ writes Will Self, ‘says nothing more substantive about the role of Manifest Destiny in American self-conception (which is what, in the final analysis, all serious westerns are about) than the last one did’. Self’s target is not simply True Grit, but the Coen brothers’ oeuvre. For Self ‘it was inevitable that, sooner or later, they would feel compelled to make – or rather, remake – a western.’ Why? Because the ‘central problem’ with the Coens’ is ‘their reflexivity as directors, making films of films rather than films tout court… this is why – even at their best – the Coens’ films have a feeling of being refracted rather than immediate experiences’ (‘Flirting with genre,’ Guardian: 12.02.01).


Is it enough to respond to Self by saying that True Grit is not a remake? That it is, instead, a ‘different version,’ a different take on the original novel by Charles Portis (Philip French, The Observer: 13.02.11). I think not. For Self it is the films of the Coens’ in general that perpetrate a refraction through other films, True Grit is simply the most obvious sign of such poverty.

Perhaps, by way of response, in order to affirm rather than negate the film, we should rather begin, at least initially, by agreeing with a certain aspect of Self’s diagnosis. We must say ‘yes’ True Grit is a remake. A remake of the 1969 version. Further, we should push on… surely Self does not go far enough? We are also tempted to say the film is a remake of The Wizard of Oz. As Krishna Stott, director-producer-writer at Bellyfeel, remarked after we saw the film, Mattie has something of the look of Judy Garland. But it goes beyond the look: a girl enters a world of dreams and nightmares. She is carried from one world to another, over the river by her horse, and – at the end of her adventure – back through the night by Rooster. The girl has adventures with a bullying coward, a man of tin and a drunken scarecrow. Or perhaps a remake of Tarkovsky’s Stalker? Which itself can be seen as a remake of The Wizard of Oz…

And of course True Grit, both films, are also interpretations of scripts, which were re-imaginings of a book. And the tone of the movie can be said to be a resituating of the literary atmosphere of a Cormac McCarthy novel, or even, in an entirely different way, the gaming environments of Red Dead Redemption. In other words, a whole nexus of remakes of remakes, including a remake of all the other films the Coens’ have made, which in turn remake other films. Is not every film a remake of other films, books, plays and paintings?


Yet we must not be hasty and claim that the problem is the exact opposite of the one posited by Self, that no film can be anything other than ‘refracted,’ that no film can reach ‘immediate experiences.’ Rather, we would like to say that the dichotomy is a false one, a false problem with a long history. Plato – in his the first version of the problem – describes a world of pure, ideal Forms that exist beyond our senses and the manifestations of those pure Forms on the Earth appear as particular objects. However, the artist, in this narrative, only makes a copy of the object, a copy of a copy, an imitation (Republic). In other words, all art is condemned as being a third degree away from the truth. Plato, will attack his own theory (Parmenades) and rework it, going on to describing two types of copy, the true and the false (Statesman; Sophist). This false copy is what will become known as the simulacrum, that which distorts. A few thousand years later Jean Baudrillard will describe the simulacrum as being a fourth remove from the truth. First comes a reflection of reality; second the distortion of reality; third the loss of reality; and finally the simulacrum, which ‘bears no relation to any reality whatsoever’ (Simulacra and Simulations). Self’s analysis is in this lineage.

It seems to us that these, and other, versions of the simulacrum partake of a fundamental negativity. Rather, we would like to suggest that every image has two sides: one true, one false; one faithful, one a simulacrum; one ‘refracted,’ one an ‘immediate experience’; one original, one a remake. Each image, each filmic composition of images, cannot but put these forces into play… the dynamics of any image, of any film, are thus the outcome of this play of forces…

Gilles Deleuze explores just such a play of forces in a number of ways throughout many of his books. For example, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze sees Plato’s negative-simulacrum as a lost opportunity. Rather than a distortion opposed to a faithful copy, the simulacrum can become an affirmative falsification, can indicate a circulation of images not a stratification of levels of truth. Deleuze will abandon the concept of the simulacrum in later work, replacing it with the rhizome, with deterritorialisation, with machinic assemblages and various other conceptual fragments. One trajectory is that of the cliché. And it here we can re-approach cinema.


As Philip French beautifully maintains, the way the courthouse is dressed and filmed in True Grit ‘evokes the paintings of Thomas Eakins, the Philadelphia recorder of emerging middle-class life, and represents the bourgeois world that's encroaching on the frontier’ (The Observer: 13.02.11). In his book on painting, Francis Bacon: the logic of sensation, Deleuze has this to say about the cliché:

‘It is a mistake to think that the painter works on a white surface… If the painter were before a white surface, he – or she – could reproduce on it an external object functioning as a model. But such is not the case. The painter has many things in his head, or around him, or in his studio. Now everything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work. They are all present in the canvas as so many images, actual or virtual, so that the painter does not have to cover a blank surface, but rather would have to empty it out, clear it, clean it. He does not paint in order to reproduce on the canvas an object functioning as a model, he paints on images that are already there, in order to produce a canvas whose functioning will reverse the relations between model and copy’ (FB, 86).

We can clearly see here the Deleuzian take on the faithful reproduction and the simulacrum… and he goes on to restate this thus ‘clichés are always already on the canvas, and if the painter is content to transform the cliché, to deform or mutilate it, to manipulate it in every possible way, this reaction is still too intellectual, too abstract: it allows the cliché to rise again from its ashes, it leaves the painter within the milieu of the cliché, or else gives him or her no other consolation than parody’ (FB, 87). So, there needs to be a second moment, ‘it would be much better to abandon oneself to clichés, to collect them. Accumulate them, multiply them, as so many prepictorial givens’ (FB, 92). In this way, ‘only when one leaves them behind, through rejection, can the work begin’ (FB, 92). Yet the question remains ‘how do I proceed so that what I paint does not become a cliché?’ (FB, 93). There is, of course, no universal solution… ‘one can fight against cliché only with much guile, perseverance, and prudence: it is a task perpetually renewed with every painting, with every moment of every paining’ (FB, 96).

In other words, even though Self’s critique of the Coens’ is badly formed (the films are bad because they are copies, rather than, all images have to escape cliché), it is none-the-less a crucial one. The question becomes, do the Coens’ – through their filmic images and procedures – manage to escape cliché, and if so, how? What is the Coens’ way? In particular with True Grit, and in general across their oeuvre.


Deleuze’s returns to the problem of clichés in his cinema books. He describes two broad domains of cinema, the movement-image and the time-image. The former aligns, more or less, with classical cinematic codes, while the latter with modernist, arthouse and postmodernist strategies. The former flows from image to image, binding the spectator to the images so as to ensure they think with the film, the latter operates through different tactics, attempting to break the flow of images, and give the spectator the chance to read, rather than simple see, the film. It might be thought that the move from movement-image to time-image describes the path from cliché to an overturning of cliché… yet this is not the case: ‘there is no value-judgement here, because this new regime – no less than the old one – throws up its ready-made formulas, its set procedures, its laboured and empty applications, its failures, its conventional and ‘second-hand’ examples offered to us as masterpieces’ (C2: 132). In other words, the moving beyond cliché has nothing to do with the move beyond classical realism. So, how do we know if a film escapes cliché…? Only in the particular strategies it puts into play…


Let us return to Self’s coup de grâce for True Grit, that the film ‘says nothing more substantive about the role of Manifest Destiny in American self-conception (which is what, in the final analysis, all serious westerns are about) than the last one did’ (‘Flirting with genre,’ Guardian: 12.02.01). We may baulk at the idea that all westerns, all so-called serious westerns, must engage with the concept of Manifest Destiny, but let us leave this to one side. We may also not want to compare True Grit 1969 to True Grit 2010, we may prefer to think the film in and of itself, but by way of conversation, let’s allow ourselves to do so…

Mattie Ross, a precocious fourteen year old girl, turns up at Fort Smith to bring the killer of her father to justice. However, Tom Chaney, the killer, has crossed the river, disappearing into ‘Indian territory’. So Mattie hires Rooster Cogburn , a man who answers – she is told – her request for a bounty hunter with true grit. Trouble is, Cogburn is a fat old drunk, well past his prime. The scenario is thus set for revenge!

In the 1969 film Cogburn takes centre stage, in the 2010 film it is Mattie. And while in both films it is Mattie who kills Chaney, and in doing so is thrown backwards by the recoil of the rifle into a snake pit, in the 1969 film she recovers, while in the 2001 film she does not. This is made explicit in the coda, which reminds us that the film began with the voice over narration of an older Mattie, thus positioning the entire film as a flashback, as a memory, a narration of an older Mattie.


This leads us on to the most crucial differentiation between the films, which can be explored through the Deleuzian cineosis. While both films are of the movement-image, their component image differs. In True Grit 1969 the action-image dominates. Action-images explore the way in which situations are associated with character behaviours. However, as we have seen, True Grit 2010 is caught within a flashback. Flashbacks operate within the domain of thought, mental-images, which explore the way in which a film captures the thinking of characters. Flashbacks are recollection-images, powerful component of the domain of thought in that they attempt to depict on-screen the remembrances of a character or characters. For Deleuze flashbacks are the instrument of ‘psychological causality,’ a ‘closed circuit which goes from the present to the past, then leads us back to the present’ (C2:47; 49). When unambiguous this is a strong sense of destiny… it is the past which leads inexorably to the present and will dictate the future.

Mattie looses her arm, remains unmarried woman, appears severe. This is not what we expect. The trials in the lands of the Choctaw were not adventures that would drag the girl from a cloistered adolescence towards a fulfilled maturity. This is why the Coens’ went into such detail of Mattie’s character in Fort Smith. These adventures essentially ruined her. The film does not explore the glory of revenge, but rather explores the futility of revenge through loss. Many years later she attempts to find Rooster at the Rodeo, but he is gone, is dead. Absences permeate the film, her father, the disappeared killer, her arm, Rooster – and… so beautifully absent we barely notice it – the Choctaw. The people are missing…

The manifest destiny of the Anglo-Saxon colonizers is revealed for what it is, the annexation of territory after territory, betrayal upon betrayal, as we know so well through Dee Brown’s Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee. Rather than an allegorical Colombia, bringing civilisation and justice, these whites are whites doing what whites do. The Coens’ True Grit does indeed have something very different to say about manifest destiny… It is the colonizers' right, their ‘manifest destiny to over spread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty,’ so wrote John O'Sullivan, democrat and New York editor of The Morning Post in 1845. And now the spirit of manifest destiny crosses oceans with democracy and oil. The Coens’ True Grit, in this way, enters into a machinic assemblage with 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq…


In a sense, you could say that the film has gone back to the book, is more true to the book than the original film. However, as we have already discovered, this is no way to designate the originality of a film, the escape from cliché. However, in the case of the Coens’ this could at least be said, in this specific instance, to be a clue, an indicator. This is a film that takes the conventions of the classic western seriously, deploys those conventions through the politics of the neo-western yet has the self-reflexive surface of the ‘post-modern’ western. The film manages to have its cake, eat it… and then throw it back up. True Grit is a return to the classic western made possible only by passing through the neo-western and the post-modern western. Which is to say, more classical than the classical, a reverence for the classical, not to copy or imitate it, but to return to the very beginning and re-invent it. To look again. And this, surely, is the procedure of the Coen’s in general, across all their films, to return to the beginning to look once more, to rediscover originality before the cliché. And this is why they are not simply content to make a western, but instead to remake a great western, one of the last great classical westerns. This is not a tribute, this is not nostalgia, this is an affirmation of cinema.


‘Sometimes,’ writes Self, ‘it occurs to me that the job of a serious cultural critic mostly consists in telling the generality of people that their opinions – on films, on books, on all manner of widgets, gadgets and even the latest electronic fidgets – simply aren’t up to scratch. It’s a dirty, thankless task, but someone has to do it’ (‘Flirting with genre,’ Guardian: 12.02.01). The Nietzschean response – a response echoed in the very procedure of Deleuze’s cinema books, where he only discusses what he considers to be masterpieces – would be ‘let looking away be my only negation!’ (The Gay Science: 173).

Sunday, 9 January 2011

Monsters (Gareth Edwards, UK, 2010)

Who are the monsters? This is the question for director Gareth Edwards: the aliens, or humanity? NASA once sent a probe to investigate the possibility of extra-terrestrial life in the far reaches of the solar system. Six years ago, upon its re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, the probe crash landed in the jungles of northern Mexico. In so doing, an alien species was let loose upon the planet. Growing from wee fungus pods into massive squid-like beasts, a vast area of the border between the USA and Mexico is now known as the Infected Zone. At the South American end, a soaring metal fence cuts across the continent; while a reinforced concrete dam divides the zone from humanity at the US border. Inside, the area has been abandoned by humanity. Cities, towns, villages have been reclaimed by jungle, now the home of the alien horde. And with each passing year – as the beasts breed and their population surges – the threat of a breaching of the boundaries becomes an ever more likely event. Accordingly, US and Mexican planes traverse the skies above the zone, laying down poison into the jungles below, in what is increasingly being seen as a futile attempt to corral the animals. Enter Scoot and Whitney: he a photojournalist who will do just about anything to hit the front page; she the daughter of the owner of Scoot’s US based newspaper. Caught up in the evacuation of Mexico where the containment barrier is first breeched, their journey takes them into the heart of darkness and out the other side: from San Jose through the Infected Zone and – after a number of close encounters with the alien beings – into the heartland of Texas. Holed up at a deserted service station awaiting transport home, they now believe themselves safe. However – just as in Mexico – the aliens overwhelm the defences. Scoot and Whitney are the first to witness aliens on US soil. Edwards plays out this scene perfectly – riffing off Jurassic Park (1993) and War of the Worlds (2005), Whitney hides beneath the counter of the shop as alien tentacles weave through the environment, searching out the nooks and crannies of the room. However – this attack is a ruse – the alien is seeking contact with its mate. Edwards creates a scene of incredible beauty as two of the aliens entwine, their tentacles enfolding tenderly, their bodies aflame with electricity, inner luminescence creating astonishing patterns in the night sky. Scoot looks on with wonder – then he and Whitney kiss for the first time.

Such a mirroring of humanity and the aliens has – in truth – been unfolding from the very beginning of the film. In the first instance, our heroes and the aliens are both adrift in the zone, in an unfamiliar environment they are not naturally disposed to. Each are attempting to survive the world which has been given to them. In the second instance, the aliens are under constant attack from the humans with their bombs and chemical weapons; while the humans are essentially prey to the alien predators. The environment describes a situation which devolves into a duel: aliens versus humanity. This mirroring – accordingly – creates a certain reciprocity. Thus the question at the heart of the film: who are the monsters in Monsters? Such a question is made possible through a cinematic process Deleuze will describe as the extreme limit of the large form action-image...

To read the full exploration of Monsters through the Deleuze's sign of 'the limit of the large form action-image,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...

Saturday, 1 January 2011

Slackistan (Hammad Khan, Pakistan, 2009)

Three young guys chill outside a café on a public square. A beautiful, warm sunny day. Behind them, a fountain propels jets of water into the air, creating spiralling parabolas. The circular glass table in front of them is clear, except for cigarettes and lighters. They sit in silence. Hasan, from time to time, checks out his blackberry, but no one has contacted him. Saad – wearing a white hoody emblazoned with ‘Horny Devil’ – twirls a dead leaf backwards, then forwards, between his fingers. Sherry has been watching people passing by. He glances at Hasan, then at Saad, sitting either side of him. Leaning back in his chair, he sighs, yawns, stretches. This is Slackistan – an indy slacker flick set in Islamabad, a few days in the limbo-lives of five middleclass friends a year after of graduating college. There is Sherry: he is skating on thin ice, clocking up debts, borrowing cash from a money lender to sustain a lifestyle above and beyond his means – out-and-about, a flash car, the latest mobile. There is Saad: he has little aspiration, and is seemingly happy to be drifting through life, although there is always some girls to be checking out. There is Aisha: she is looking for marriage, a wealthy man, so she can continue doing nothing but with more style. There is Xara / Zara: she is mixed up, confused, melancholic, rebellious. And at the centre and describing the circumference of the film, Hasan. Slackistan is Hasan’s story – or rather, the lives of the five friends as seen from Hasan’s perspective. Director Hammad Khan will create a mosaic of images: short scenes of conversations which go nowhere; a character wandering the streets on their own; trying on different clothes in the mirror before being able to step out; staring absentmindedly over the cityscape from the hills or tall buildings. In voice-over, Hasan will comment upon these images, even if he is not present, not only providing a narrative cohesion to the film but also interrogating their slacker lifestyle. In this way, Hasan’s reflections are an immediate evaluation of the narration. Such reflection is the foundation and inspires the constitution of Slackistan...

Sherry glances at Hasan, then at Saad, sitting either side of him. Leaning back in his chair, he sighs, yawns, stretches: ‘I am so bored.’...

Slackistan is a film – as Deleuze would comment – populated by ‘weaklings and idiots’ (C1:184). Where ‘landscapes are dwarfed or flattened, they turn sad and dismal, even tend to disappear’ (C1:184-5). Where ‘[t]he beings who frequent’ such spaces ‘no longer have Visions’ (C1:185). Slackistan  is a figure of enfeeblement, the characters are reduced to 'tiny point[s] fleeing towards the horizon' (C1:185)...

To read the full exploration of Slackistan through the Deleuze's sign of the 'figure of enfeeblement,' see Deleuze's Cinema Books: Three Introductions to the Taxonomy of Images...